

SUPPLEMENT TO “WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES?  
AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS”  
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APPENDIX C: TRANSLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS

*Instructions*

Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. In case you should have questions at any time, please raise your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment.

You will receive 2.50 EUR for arriving on time. Depending on the decisions made, you may receive an additional amount (as described below). At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you individually and privately in cash.

The experiment consists of 8 rounds. In *each* round, you will interact with a *different*, randomly chosen participant. Under no circumstances will you interact with the same participant twice. No participant will learn the identity of the persons with whom he or she has interacted during the experiment.

At the end of the experiment, *one* of the 8 rounds will be randomly chosen for payment (every round is equally likely). The amount that you will receive at the end of the experiment will depend on the decisions made in that round.

Each round consists of four steps, which are described below.

**Step 1: Communication phase.** At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly matched with a *potential interaction partner*. During the communication phase, you will have the opportunity to communicate with this participant. Every participant can send two messages to the other. One participant will be randomly chosen to send the first message. After that, both participants will alternate.

*Important: You are not allowed to reveal your identity to the other participant. (That is, you may not reveal your name or any other identifying feature such as gender, hair color, or seat number.) In every other respect, you are free to send any message you like. Please continue to remain quiet while communicating with the other participant. Participants who violate these rules (experimenter discretion) will be excluded from the experiment and all payments.*

**Step 2: Role assignment.** After the communication phase, one participant in each pair will be randomly assigned to Role A, the other to Role B (you will learn more on the meaning of these roles below). Your role will be randomly assigned anew in *each* round. It is always equally likely that you will be assigned to Roll A or Roll B.

(The sequence in which messages are sent is not related to the roles that will be assigned to the participants. This means that you will not know during the communication phase which of the two participants will occupy Role A and which will occupy Role B in the subsequent round.)

**Step 3: Exchanging of interaction partners.** In *half* of all pairs, interaction partners will be exchanged after roles have been assigned. This is done in such a way that each new pair will again consist of one participant A and one participant B. The remaining pairs will remain fixed; i.e., with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ , your interaction partner will be exchanged after roles are assigned.

Only participant A will find out whether her interaction partner has been exchanged. In contrast, participant B will not know whether her interaction partner has been exchanged.

**Step 4: Decision phase.** During the decision phase, participant A will decide whether he or she wishes to roll or not roll a die. If A chooses *Don't Roll*, A receives 14 EUR and B receives 0 EUR. If A chooses *Roll*, A receives 10 EUR and rolls a six-sided die to determine B's payoff. (The computer will draw a random integer between 1 and 6. Every integer is equally likely, just like a normal die.) If the number 1 comes up, B receives 0 EUR. If one of the numbers 2–6 is rolled, B receives 12 EUR. (All of these amounts are in addition to the 2.50 EUR show-up fee.) This information is summarized in the following table:

Payoffs From the Decision		
	A Receives	B Receives
A chooses <i>Don't Roll</i>	14 EUR	0 EUR
A chooses <i>Roll</i> , die = 1	10 EUR	0 EUR
A chooses <i>Roll</i> , die = 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6	10 EUR	12 EUR

**Information at the end of a round.** If you were participant A, you will learn the payoff of both participants at the end of the round. In case you have chosen to *Roll*, you will also find out the number that was rolled.

If you were participant B, you will learn only your own payoff. Other than what can be concluded from this payoff, participant B will not find out which choice participant A has made. Participant B will also not find out whether her partner was exchanged after communication.

**Bonus: Guessing.** At certain points, you will have the additional possibility to earn a small amount by guessing the decisions of the other participant. Guessing will be paid in every round that is *not* chosen for payment of the decision. You will learn more about this during the experiment.

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